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Abstract. This article offers comprehensive criticism of the Turing test and de-
velops quality criteria for new artificial general intelligence (AGI) assessment 
tests. It is shown that the prerequisites A. Turing drew upon when reducing per-
sonality and human consciousness to “suitable branches of thought” reflected the 
engineering level of his time. In fact, the Turing “imitation game” employed only 
symbolic communication and ignored the physical world. This paper suggests 
that by restricting thinking ability to symbolic systems alone Turing unknowingly 
constructed “the wall” that excludes any possibility of transition from a complex 
observable phenomenon to an abstract image or concept. It is, therefore, sensible 
to factor in new requirements for AI (artificial intelligence) maturity assessment 
when approaching the Turing test. Such AI must support all forms of communi-
cation with a human being, and it should be able to comprehend abstract images 
and specify concepts as well as participate in social practices. 
Keywords: Robotics, Artificial Intelligence, Turing, the Turing test, Philoso-
phy of Artificial Intelligence, Philosophy of Mind 
1 Introduction. Turing methodology for assessment of 
artificial intelligence (1950–2014) 
Alan Turing, a British mathematician, laid in his works (1937–1952) a foundation for 
the research into what we now call “artificial intelligence” (AI) or “artificial general 
intelligence” (AGI). Relying on the new theory of computability and information, on 
the one hand, and on the first machines engineered for universal computing, on the 
other, Turing directly approached the difficult question, “Can machines think?”. Cer-
tainly, he could not create a model that would completely describe human reasoning or 
even the work of the brain as a basis for thinking. There was an obvious lack of neuro-
biological data at that time. Therefore, he simplified the model by reducing it to a ma-
chine resembling a communicating person with “suitable branches of thought” as A. 
Turing put it [3]. 
This simplification became the basis for A. Turing’s thesis about isomorphic features 
between thinking and computing: “If we consider the result of the work of calculators 
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(that is people employed for computing) as intellectual, then why cannot we make a 
similar assumption regarding machines that perform these operations faster than peo-
ple?” [1]. 
In this work Turing was also the first one to analyze the role of “embodied intelli-
gence”. He believed that a certain creature equipped with microphones, television cam-
eras and loudspeakers could be taught to walk while balancing its limbs and being 
equipped with a telecontrolled brain. Turing believed that if they had created such a 
“monster” based on the technologies available at the time, it would have been “certainly 
enormous” and would have posed a serious threat to the inhabitants. Thus, having rec-
ognized the ability to imitate humans as “embodied intelligence”, Turing pointed out 
that “the creature would still have no access to food, sex, sport and many other simple 
human joys” [1]. As envisioned by Turing, future researchers had to focuse on imitating 
human intelligence in the following five areas: (1) various games, such as chess, tic-
tac-toe, poker, bridge; (2) learning languages; (3) translations from one language into 
another; (4) cryptography; (5) mathematics. 
Of these five areas, Turing believed (4) was the most practically useful for AI [1]. 
Pointing out these exact areas of research has affected the entire subsequent course of 
AI development up until now; relatively homogeneous tasks, partially solved by Von 
Neumann’s architecture computers, made it possible to obtain new results by simply 
speeding up computational capabilities. A certain developmental inertia emerged when 
enormous efforts were devoted to solving a very narrow range of tasks. Human thinking 
and society, however, deal with a much wider range of “puzzles”. As a result, available 
software AI systems are used in various fields of application but still cannot be safely 
and applied in the real world for general cases. This builds up unfounded expectation 
from AI as we want general intelligence from systems which are not designed for the 
real world. 
In his most frequently cited work Turing suggested playing an “imitation game”, 
which, in essence, was an engineering solution to the problem of answering the question 
“Can a machine think?”. Instead of working on definitions of what “machine intelli-
gence” or human intelligence is, Turing proposed a “blind” comparison of a man’s key 
intellectual ability – reasoning and lying – with the actions of a computer. The imitation 
game became the foundation of the Turing methodology for constructing AGI. In this 
paper, drawing on the original work by Turing and applying the descriptive methodol-
ogy proposed by A. Alekseev in [2], we will briefly look into the scheme proposed by 
Turing 
Having set the directions of the research (languages, translations, games, cryptog-
raphy and mathematics) in his previous works, in 1950 [3] A. Turing proposed a meth-
odology for determining the achievement of the final result. Only in the mid-1970s this 
methodology came to be called the Turing test, although essentially it remained the 
methodology for determining the achievement of the final result (definition-of-done) in 
the AI research program. 
AI researchers and philosophers have been developing various methodologies that 
could become foundations for a more advanced methodology than that of the Turing 
test. Unfortunately, in the pursuit of designing more adequate tests, the researchers have 
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been overlooking some important details in the methodology proposed by Turing. This 
paper attempts to address this shortcoming. 
2 Methodology for the critical analysis of the Turing test 
 
After the introduction it seems necessary to indicate the main methodological difficul-
ties in the modern assessment of the Turing test: 
a) The test has grown so popular that it pushes many researchers towards a simplified 
version: “within 5 minutes of a telephone talk you must understand whether you are 
talking to a machine or a person”; 
b) any scientific research requires simple and transparent testing, yet a reliable as-
sessment of human consciousness and intelligence is still under debate. Nevertheless, 
all engineering products tend to be tested, and since “AI” is most often presented in the 
form of software products, the test boils down to communication with the software. 
This has formed the perceptive inertia for “intelligent machines”. 
If we turn to the Turing’s methodology proper, it is necessary to pay attention to the 
following three aspects that are important for our subsequent considerations. 
Firstly, all the five areas of research originally proposed by Turing (like chess) are 
more suitable than others (like gymnastics) to the symbolic approach as we communi-
cate them through symbols to one another and subsequently to machines. 
The evolution of digital computers over the last seven decades since Turing original 
proposal has greatly expanded the scope of their application, but it did not change the 
approach which still relies on the primitive Turing machines working with symbolic 
systems. It is the speed of symbolic processing that has changed. As D. Dennett put it, 
“All the improvements in computers since Turing invented his imaginary paper-tape 
machines are simply ways of making them faster” [4]. 
Secondly, the Turing methodology always implies a wall separating the two key 
participants. All subsequent modifications of the Turing methodology that arose after 
1952 implied a comparison by a Judge (J) of the activities by a Human (H) and a Com-
puter (C), but their activities were always separated by an impenetrable wall. J was the 
only one who interacted with C or H through the “Turing Wall” which was transparent 
only to symbolic communication. But H and C did not communicate at all and did not 
solve any problems together. 
Thirdly, Turing believed that the problem was “mainly that of programming”, and 
he did not consider the need to accelerate the operating speed of digital computers in 
order to solve the problem of the “imitation game”. In other words, Turing saw the task 
of creating AI as designing a system of abstractions that could recognize and take into 
account all the nuances of human communication. Turing was fully aware of the prob-
lem of a multi-level symbolic game, noting that an interlocutor’s task lies in the most 
complicated field, noting that it “seems however to depend rather too much on sense 
organs and locomotion to be feasible” [1]. Unfortunately, this remark was largely over-
looked by the subsequent generations of researchers, who considered linguistic behav-
ior and the ability to play games to be enough of an intelligence indicator and took for 
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granted the study of imitating the reasoning of a person or of the ability to play games. 
Here, we can see the emergence of a paradox: on the one hand, these three aspects of 
the methodology proposed by A. Turing constitute the cornerstone of all research be-
tween 1950–2014 aimed at implementation of “artificial intelligence”; on the other 
hand, this methodology was insufficient to solve a whole set of problems that “natural 
intelligence” solves. Thus, it seems, the Turing test should not be chosen as a reliable 
criterion for creating “artificial intelligence”. All the five Turing’s areas of research 
require solving calculation tasks, whereas human intelligence is not limited to infor-
mation processing, but also includes formulation of new concepts and finding certain 
patterns of objects through observation (without necessarily fixating all the rest). 
Nevertheless, the Turing methodology has become the basis for a huge family of 
various AI tests. It is similar to the mechanistic materialism of the 18th century: initially 
limited, it, nevertheless, made it possible to solve a whole class of specific problems 
[3]. 
The object of this article is to make a step forward from the Turing test as a criterion 
for creating a mature AI. It is necessary to show the fundamental limitations of the 
Turing methodology and develop an approach to assessing the tests created for situa-
tions that are not supposed to pass the Turing test. 
The subject of the article is to reject the consciousness modelling paradigm that was 
based on the use of symbolic systems alone, as well as to reject the contradiction of 
new approaches in AI assessment with the neopositivist foundations of the Turing test. 
Our criterion comes down to a more complete assessment of a personality and 
agency of an individual. 
3 The continuum of Turing-like tests and its limitations 
Almost seventy years have passed since Turing expressed his revolutionary philosoph-
ical ideas about the possibility of creating “thinking machines” in his fundamental work 
published in the journal Mind [3]. Several generations of mathematicians, philosophers 
and researchers of AI have devoted multiple articles to his mental experiments. As a 
result, a whole set of Turing-like tests have been designed. However, if one carefully 
considers this set of mental experiments and engineering solutions aimed at determin-
ing the definition-of-done approach to AI (summarized in Alekseev’s work [3]), one 
can identify two axes that are orthogonal to each other, and which we call the dimen-
sions of the “Turing-like testing continuum.” All tests are grouped around them. 
3.1 From Verbal to Non-verbal 
Verbal interaction with AI involves the exchange of meaningful information messages, 
abstractions and images in a specific linguistic context. The meaning of the messages 
is set precisely by their verbal semantics. These messages can refer to everyday life 
(“What day is it today?”) or bear imaginative content (“What if the universe were 
closed?”). 
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Non-verbal (one might say, non-linguistic) interaction with AI involves the ex-
change of information messages without using a language. This may include facial ex-
pressions, gestures, movements, motor skills and even emotions that are expressed in 
specific actions (laughter, crying, sadness, suffering). 
3.2 From Virtual to Physical  
Virtual interaction with AI happens exclusively via computer interfaces available to us, 
including traditional (and becoming outdated) hardware such as monitor displays, key-
boards, augmented / virtual reality devices and even exciting brain-computer interfaces. 
Physical interaction with AI (although the word “robot” can be used in this context 
meaning an “actuated computer with AI”) occurs in the physical world and involves its 
active transformation by AI itself. It requires a specific ability to affect other physical 
objects. A robot operating in the kitchen can wash the dishes, an unmanned autonomous 
motorcar drives us from point A to point B. All these actions necessarily occur in the 
physical world. 
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.  
Fig. 1. Shows the continuum of Turing-like tests correlated on the virtual-physical and verbal-
nonverbal axes 
3.3 Four Areas for AGI development 
 
The two dimensions described above have given us four areas. Let us consider the four 
areas of this continuum as shown in Fig.1 in more detail. 
Verbal interaction in the virtual world. For historical reasons, most of the tests 
(mental experiments) developed before 2008 fall into this area. In fact, the classic Tu-
ring test, Lady Lovelace’s creativity test, Colby’s paranoid test, Shannon’s social test, 
Watt’s test (Turing’s inverted test), Searle’s Chinese room experiment, and Block’s 
psycho-functional test are focused on testing verbal abilities in human / AI interaction. 
In this case, a person interacts with the virtual world environment (a display, a key-
board, a mouse). 
Verbal interaction in the physical world. This area was not popular among re-
searchers, as it was rejected by Turing from the outset. Only S. Harnad [5] and A. 
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Alekseev [2] proposed complex tests demonstrating verbal interaction of humans and 
AI in the physical world. Although there is a related field of research where the emo-
tional trace of the transmitted message and the study of its subtlest aspects is of great 
importance. 
Non-verbal interaction in the virtual world. This area of the Turing-like tests con-
tinuum was overlooked by researchers for a long time, although it was Turing himself 
who, for the first time, drew attention to its importance for AI when he said that intel-
ligent machines can play chess at the human level. After all a game (chess or any other) 
between AI and humans is a non-verbal manifestation of intellectual abilities in the 
virtual space. However, a game of chess remains to be a codified form of interaction. 
The next in the same area of this continuum are the tests related to recognition of images 
[6] and recognition or synthesis of human speech [7]. These tests, which played a huge 
role in the advancement of AI technologies, are nothing more than human-machine 
interaction in the virtual environment. In this case, AI does not change the physical 
world in any way, and at the same time there is no semantic verbal interaction, even in 
case with speech recognition a machine can only identify the correct words but does 
not understand their meanings. 
Non-verbal interaction in the physical world. This area is the hardest to master 
for AI, since it depends the most on the development level of robotics, sensorics and 
AI technologies. If the virtual world possesses standard characteristics of the external 
environment, then the reality is inexhaustible, the role of chance is high, while abstract-
ing is hampered. From the outset, this area has been ignored by researchers, including 
Turing himself, although its importance in human communication is emphasized by all 
researchers of communication. Ishiguro [8] suggests checking the technological ma-
turity of robotics and AI by contrasting an android robot and a person in simple acts of 
communication: the robot only says the pre-programmed human phrases, even though 
bearing the maximum resemblance to a person. Another example of a test where AI and 
robots performed the tasks that people would generally do was the large-scale DARPA 
Robotics Challenge held in 2015. At this competition robots interacted with the physi-
cal world eliminating the consequences of a nuclear disaster at the training ground, 
although there was no verbal communication with the people. The latest example of 
this is numerous driving contests where robots compete with humans in speed, accuracy 
and safety [9]. 
In 2018, R. Brooks [10] suggested a number of new tests for AGI. He proposed to 
see child capabilities as an indicator of technological achievement in AGI and robotics, 
drifting away from the Turing “conversational” paradigm of AGI and people communi-
cating through walls. He called it “a competency-based” approach: (1) robots should 
be taught to recognize any objects in the physical world at least at the level of a two-
year-old child; (2) robots should be taught to recognize natural language at least at the 
level of a four-year-old child; (3) robots should possess manual dexterity and fine motor 
skills of at least a six-year-old child; (4) robots should have social communication skills 
of at least an eight-year-old child. 
  With these requirements in view, the Brooks’ test is divided into four parts (1–4) 
and is placed sequentially in all the areas of the Turing-like test continuum in Fig. 1. 
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  E.LENA test. In 2019, a specialized platform was developed at Sberbank Robotics 
Laboratory in order to convert text into a video image of a television presenter. The 
platform is called E.LENA (Electronic Lena) [11]. The idea of assigning visual forms 
to AI first became popular in science fiction. Yet, researchers did not embrace AI vis-
ualization as an object of study, since the appropriate technology has not existed up 
until now. We are the first to propose a perception test for identification of a digital 
television announcer by comparing it to a human announcer. This approach helps re-
searchers to embrace a twofold improvement of AI technology – while testing is being 
done on the verbal interaction in the virtual world, itis simultaneously conducted in the 
non-verbal-virtual world.  
We need to emphasize the two observations from above. Firstly, the majority of tests 
invented by the researchers, starting with A. Turing, implied performance in one spe-
cific area, which, according to the researchers, was best suited to the task of creating 
AGI. Setting tests’ goals for engineering research by designing ‘definition of done’ for 
AGI (the best performance of certain robots or AGI in one of the four particular areas) 
defined their approach to designing programs, computers architectures and robots. Re-
searchers and engineers build machines that perform at their best only in one specific 
area (like verbal interaction in the virtual world): the technology and computer archi-
tecture used for a chat-bot that excels in deceiving humans are utterly useless for a self-
driving application. Various AGI/AI systems are designed and evolve only within their 
enclosed areas separated by the Turing walls from other areas of application.  
Secondly, the Turing wall separating the subject of the test (a human judge) from the 
test object (a computer, a robot) only continued to solidify. Researchers could not even 
think of a computer/robot meeting face-to-face and interacting with each other (a typi-
cal estimate of the timing of an AI creation considers the time-out of this event, but not 
the specifics of programming or computer architecture [12,13]). A computer or a robot 
contests human in each of these areas. If AI performance is better than a tested human, 
then we have arrived to our goal. 
To sum up, each of the tests from the past seventy years has only strengthened the 
Turing wall, which separated the area of verbal-virtual communication between a ma-
chine and a person from the huge and incredibly unpredictable world beyond this wall. 
This leads to a situation where human knowledge and experience mastered by AI in 
one area (non-verbal in the virtual world) cannot be transferred to another area (non-
verbal in the physical world) because they are ultimately separated by ‘the Turing wall’. 
By original design, our AI systems do not have the capability to learn and act in more 
than one of the areas from Fig.1. All these concerns are the deficiencies of the Turing 
methodology. 
4 Empirical identification of inadequacy of the Turing test  
Over the past ten years two important trends have shattered the Turing wall so much 
that it gave a deep crack and is about to collapse. 
The first trend became obvious in the summer of 2014, when the Royal Society in 
London carried out the “Turing test” competition. The winner was a chatbot named 
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Eugene Goostman that imitated the identity of a thirteen-year-old boy from Odessa. 
This chatbot fooled over 30% of the judges. 
This Turing-inspired test invoked much criticism. The main point of it was that de-
spite overcoming the symbolic barrier in deceiving people no significant breakthrough 
occurred either in research or in applied technologies: chatbots still remained quite lim-
ited in their capabilities, so declaring that they understand a person is possible only in 
a figurative sense. According to the cognitive scientist G. Marcus, this test did not show 
that one can consider AI as created, but merely revealed “the ease with which we can 
fool others” [14], thus reducing the Turing test to a psychological measure of human 
narcissism, rather than of AI development. Chatbots can at best digress from the topic 
of discussion causing the interlocutor to feel surprised and thereby give themselves 
away. The philosopher A. Sloman speaks about the irrelevance of the Turing test 
method as a behavioristic approach to assessing the intelligence of any system, as well 
as to assessing the solvability of any true problem [15]. 
In other words, chatbots outplay humans when dealing exclusively with abstractions, 
but the concretization of the gain and its correlation with reality is only possible with 
human intervention. Chess programs or chatbots have been beating humans in purely 
symbolic competitions for several years now. But they do not become full-fledged 
agents, and they cannot adapt the skills they acquired to other tasks like driving. 
The second trend relies on the popular approach based on “brute force” and “greedy” 
(for data) neural networks but it will not help to answer the original question “Can a 
machine think?”. Let’s conduct a mental experiment which we might call an “ultimate 
imitation game”. Suppose that we have limitless computing power and our neural net-
work architecture is capable of processing texts without human supervisors (this con-
dition does not alter the results but makes the experiment longer). Then, imagine that 
we have managed to recruit (for a short time) volunteers to imitate all men and women 
of the Earth and have divided them into two groups. The first group will consist of an 
equal number of men and women, and the second group will consist of men or women 
acting as judges (the gender does not matter here). If we assume that the number of 
adult inhabitants of the Earth is 6 billion, then there will be exactly 4 billion people in 
the first group (equally men and women) and 2 billion people in the group of judges. 
After that both groups begin playing the classic imitation game and record all their 
dialogues and results with the judges. Now, let’s suppose that we have all the computing 
power for an unsupervised deep learning neural network which enables us to train a 
neural network to answer any conceivable question based on the previous imitation 
games. It seems likely that if such a computer starts a game in tandem with a woman 
and claims to be a woman (as described above, following A. Turing), the judge will 
most likely be unable to distinguish the computer from a woman, and the judge will be 
equally likely able to identify the AI or the person in this game. Will this mean that the 
Turing’s criteria are observed, and the true General AI is achieved? It does not seem 
so, since Turing said that a computer should imitate the reasoning of a man who is 
pretending to be a woman. In this mental experiment the computer is literally reproduc-
ing some of the most successful phrases of men who managed to fool the judges and 
won the game. However, this computer is uncapable of acquiring any “reasoning” fac-
ulty. It only demonstrates the ability to quickly find a relevant phrase based on the 
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training set. As a result, this mental experiment supplies us with a dialogue interface 
capable of skillful imitation, but the computer interface is completely devoid of intelli-
gence. 
It seems that this conclusion of the mental experiment is the main reason why the 
approach based on the Turing method (the Turing test) ceases to be relevant and should 
give way to another approach based on a post-Turing methodology. 
5 Post-Turing methodology principles for the study of AI 
It seems quite logical to establish a new methodology for assessing the achievements 
in AI by taking into account both the experience of the last seventy years and the newer 
technological capabilities. In fact, the first attempts were made right after the 2014 Tu-
ring test competition in London [16-22]. However, they are all lacking a practical im-
plementation across the entire Turing continuum, outlined in Fig.1. 
Firstly, in our concept of an intelligent computer we should reject anthropomor-
phism. The wall constructed by Turing is bound to separate the J and the tested H or C 
and essentially stimulates a person to evaluate AI in contrast to oneself, creating exces-
sive technological anthropomorphism. However, man has learned how to fly by using 
the technologies that were totally different from the bird wings. Creating AI capable of 
reasoning and communicating like a person is probably not the most potent answer to 
the Turing’s question, “Can machines think?”. It is counterproductive to discuss the 
ethical limitations of precisely humanoid robots [23]. If we evaluate the design of mod-
ern robots, then the simplest question – “How many fingers should a manipulator hand 
have?” – can generate multiple answers, and the two-finger solution becomes a wide-
spread type of “hand” [24]. 
Secondly, we can talk about a variety of forms and methods of cognition available 
to computers. AI should use abstraction and concretization on a broad scale. Here, the 
ideal is an independent formulation of new concepts and modeling of its own 
worldview – of course, with restrictions considering human safety. Now numerous at-
tempts are being made not only to improve recognition of images but also, on the basis 
of I. Lakatos’ theory of games and concepts, to compile a conceptual apparatus for a 
more flexible interaction of computers and mathematicians [25]. 
Thirdly, there should be a diversity of the same forms of communication that are 
available to humans. Machines have widely mastered computerized communication in 
symbolic structures, while the motor skills of robots remain imperfect. Virtual-non-
verbal, physical-non-verbal and physical-verbal interactions are still hampered. Prob-
ably, the ideal that machines should strive for is an emotionally colored communication 
involving “the five senses”, so that a robot could convey information in any set of sen-
sations available to humans. Here, a good example would be an automated translation 
from the sign language of the deaf to the test and vice versa. For now, we can only see 
it on the displays, but it should soon become accessible to robot operators. 
Fourthly, a robot should participate in human social practices as a junior partner, but 
nonetheless possessing an agency. R. Brooks in his tests compared AI with the levels 
of child development – yet still what could be a better assessment criterion for 
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communication skills than life in society? After all, child development is inseparable 
from socialization. 
As to the Turing-like tests continuum in Fig.1, we should advise other researchers 
and engineers to design and develop AI (be it robots or AI-enabled computers) capable 
of attaining to the human expertise and acting similarly to humans in more than one 
area. This approach breaks the walls between the areas and makes AI more useful and 
robust for real life applications as well as useful for human-to-machine interactions. 
Moreover, the post-Turing methodology requires no blind comparison of a human and 
machine performance (like in the Turing test) but demands a higher overall perfor-
mance from a human and a machine learning and acting together.  
6 Conclusion 
The Turing test has virtually lost its relevance and meaning as even computer software 
falling short of being called AGI in the full sense of the word can pass such tests in 
systems of symbolic communication. Moreover, applications can practice abstraction 
only in minimal forms, which puts a limitation on their cognitive abilities. 
Overcoming anthropomorphism and the Turing approach to assessing AGI will al-
low us to focus on creating the systems that can demonstrate various skills in four main 
areas: shaping the system for labor operations; proper formulation of new concepts (ab-
stracting) and their use (concretization); communication with a person involving all the 
five senses; and, finally, possessing a personal social agency. 
The suggested post-Turing methodology might be a good foundation for the future 
research and engineering efforts because it does not oppose a human to a machine but 
makes a human and a machine act together  in various areas of their interaction irre-
spective of either the physical or the virtual worlds. Such approach will provide more 
safety and security for the humankind as the advent of artificial general intelligence is 
inevitable. 
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